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The health insurance characteristics of the population changes sharply at age 65 as most people become
eligible for Medicare.  But do these changes matter for health?  We address this question using data
on over 400,000 hospital admissions for people who are admitted through the emergency room for
"non-deferrable" conditions -- diagnoses with the same daily admission rates on weekends and weekdays.
Among this subset of patients there is no discernible rise in the number of admissions at age 65, suggesting
that the severity of illness is similar for patients on either side of the Medicare threshold.  The insurance
characteristics of the two groups are much different, however, with a large jump at 65 in the fraction
who have Medicare as their primary insurer, and a reduction in the fraction with no coverage.  These
changes are associated with significant increases in hospital list chargers, in the number of procedures
performed in hospital, and in the rate that patients are transferred to other care units in the hospital.
We estimate a nearly 1 percentage point drop in 7-day mortality for patients at age 65, implying that
Medicare eligibility reduces the death rate of this severely ill patient group by 20 percent.  The mortality
gap persists for at least two years following the initial hospital admission.
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Nicole_Maestas@rand.orgMedicare pays nearly one-fifth of total health care costs in the United States. Yet, 
evidence on the health effects of the program is limited.  Studies of aggregate death rates before 
and after the introduction of Medicare show little indication of a program impact (Finkelstein 
and McKnight, 2005).  The age profiles of mortality and self-reported health in the population as 
a whole are likewise remarkably smooth around the eligibility threshold at age 65 (Dow, 2004; 
Card, Dobkin and Maestas, 2004).  While existing research has shown that the utilization of 
health care services increases once people become eligible for Medicare (e.g., Decker and 
Rapaport, 2002, McWilliams et al., 2003, Card, Dobkin and Maestas, 2004; McWilliams et al., 
2007), the health impact of these additional services remains uncertain. 
This paper presents new evidence on the health effects of Medicare, based on differences 
in mortality for severely ill people who are admitted to California hospitals just before and just 
after their 65
th birthday.   Specifically, we focus on unplanned admissions through the emergency 
room for “non-deferrable” conditions – those with similar weekend and weekday admission 
rates.  We argue that the decision to present at an emergency room is unlikely to depend on 
insurance status for patients with these conditions.  Consistent with this assertion, the arrival rate 
is nearly identical for patients just under and just over age 65.  In contrast, admission rates for all 
causes jump 7% once people reach 65, and even total emergency room admissions rise by 3%. 
Focusing on non-deferrable admissions, we turn to an analysis of the age profiles of 
patient characteristics and outcomes, testing for discontinuities at age 65.  The demographic 
composition and diagnosis mix of the sample trend smoothly through the age 65 barrier, as 
would be expected under the assumption of no differential sample selection pre- and post-
Medicare eligibility.  On the other hand, the fraction of patients with Medicare as their primary   2
insurer rises by about 50 percentage points, while the fraction with no insurance drops by 8 
percentage points    
Associated with these changes in insurance we find a small but statistically significant 
increase in the number of procedures performed in the hospital, and a similar rise in total list 
charges. We also find a relatively large increase in the likelihood that patients are transferred to 
other units within the same hospital (mainly skilled nursing facilities) and a reduction in the 28-
day readmission rate.  Finally, using death records matched to our sample of hospital admissions, 
we find a clearly discernable drop in mortality once people become eligible for Medicare.  
Relative to people who are just under 65 when admitted, those who are just over 65 have about a 
1 percentage point lower likelihood of death within a week of admission, or roughly a 20 percent 
reduction in 7-day mortality.  A similar absolute reduction in mortality is registered at 28 days 
and 90 days, and persists for at least two years after admission, suggesting that the differential 
treatment afforded to those with Medicare coverage has an important long-run impact on patient 
survival. 
We conclude by discussing potential channels for the Medicare effect.  One possibility is 
that it reflects changes in treatment intensity and mortality for the small fraction (<10%) of 
patients who move from uninsured to insured status once Medicare is available.  In fact, the 
magnitude of our estimated mortality effect is too large (and too widely distributed) to be driven 
entirely by this group. We argue that a more plausible channel is the easing of case review 
procedures and other restrictions as patients who were previously covered by private insurance 
or Medicaid become Medicare-eligible at 65.  
The next section presents a brief overview of the Medicare program and existing research 
on its impacts.  Section III outlines our regression-discontinuity research design.  Section IV   3
describes our procedure for identifying non-deferrable emergency room admissions, and 
summarizes our tests for differential selectivity between patients just under and just over 65.  
Section V presents our main analysis of the age profiles of treatment intensity and mortality for 
the sub-sample of non-deferrable admissions.  Section VI discusses potential channels for the 
Medicare effect on treatment intensity and heath.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II. Medicare: Background and Previous Studies 
a. Medicare Eligibility and Health Insurance  
  Medicare is provided to people who are 65 or older and have worked at least 10 years in 
covered employment.
1  Medicare is also provided to people under 65 who are receiving Social 
Security Disability Insurance (DI): currently about 12% of the population is already on the 
program by the time they reach 65.
2  Age-eligible individuals can enroll on the first day of the 
month that they turn 65 and obtain Medicare hospital insurance (Part A) for free.  Medicare Part 
B, which covers doctor bills and some other charges, is available for a modest monthly premium. 
  The onset of Medicare eligibility leads to sharp changes in health insurance status at age 
65.  Figure 1 illustrates the transition using data from the 1999-2003 National Health Interview 
Surveys (NHIS) on four different dimensions of insurance coverage: Medicare coverage; any 
insurance coverage; coverage by multiple policies; and having primary insurance coverage in a 
managed care policy.  The figure shows the means of each outcome by age (measured in 
quarters), as well as the fitted age profiles from a simple regression that includes a quadratic in 
age, a dummy for age over 65, and interactions of the dummy with age and age-squared.  
                                                 
1 Spouses of people who qualify are also qualified.  U.S. citizens and legal aliens with at least five years of 
residency can also enroll in Medicare at age 65 by paying monthly premiums    4
  The fraction of people with Medicare coverage rises by about 60 percentage points at age 
65.
3  Apart from this, the age profile is relatively smooth and well-described by a simple 
quadratic function.  Associated with the rise in Medicare coverage is an increase of about 9 
percentage points in the fraction of people with any coverage, leaving only about 3 percent of the 
population over 65 uninsured, compared with about 13% of those under 65. 
  The two other insurance characteristics shown in Figure 1 also change sharply at 65.  The 
fraction of the population covered by multiple policies rises by about 45%, as many of those with 
privately insurance before 65 obtain a supplemental policy to “top up” their Medicare coverage.
4  
Conversely, the fraction of people covered by managed care in their primary policy falls by 30%.  
This drop reflects the relatively high rate of managed care coverage in the pre-65 insurance 
market, coupled with the relatively low fraction of Medicare recipients who choose managed 
care over traditional fee-for-service insurance.
5 
  To summarize, the data in Figure 1 show striking changes in the heath insurance 
coverage of the population at age 65.  Within a few weeks of becoming eligible for Medicare, 
nearly 80% of the population is enrolled in the program.  In the process, about ¾ of those who 
were previously uninsured obtain coverage.  Many Medicare enrollees who were previously 
covered by a private plan enroll in a supplemental policy, creating a sharp rise in the incidence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Autor and Duggan (2003) for a recent analysis of trends in DI.  A very small number of people who need 
kidney dialysis are also eligible. 
3 Other data sources (e.g., the Survey of Income and Program Participation and the Current Population Survey, show 
somewhat higher Medicare enrollment after age 65.  We suspect that at least some of the over-65 respondents in 
the NHIS who do not report Medicare are actually covered.  It is widely believed that the participation rate in 
Medicare Part A by people eligible for the program is close to 100% (Remler and Glied, 2003).  
4 Medicare Parts A and B include significant deductibles and require a co-insurance payment of 20% on many bills.  
Some individuals obtain supplementary coverage through a previous employer, while others purchase a private 
“Medigap” policy.  
5 In our NHIS sample about 85% of Medicare recipients are enrolled in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. Prior to 
2003 the only managed care option in Medicare was to enroll in a Medicare HMO plan.   5
multiple-coverage.  And, since most Medicare recipients choose traditional fee-for-service 
coverage, the fraction of the population with managed care is cut in half.   
 
b. Impacts of Medicare 
Existing research has shown that the onset of Medicare age-eligibility leads to an increase 
in the use of health services.  Two early studies focus on changes in the use of medical screening 
procedures by people who were less likely to have health insurance prior to 65.  Decker and 
Rapaport (2002) find a relative increase in mammogram screenings by less-educated and black 
women after 65.  McWilliams et al. (2003) find that medical screenings increase more for people 
who lacked insurance coverage in the two years before reaching age 65.  A study by Dow (2004) 
compares changes in hospitalization rates from 1963 (3 years before the introduction of 
Medicare) to 1970 (4 years after) for different age groups and finds a relative rise among those 
65 and older.  Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2007) examine the age profiles of hospital admissions 
in California, Florida, and New York, and find large increases in hospitalization rates at age 65, 
particularly for elective procedures like coronary bypass surgery (16% increase in admission 
rates), and hip and knee replacement (23% increase).  McWilliams et al. (2007) find that 
hospitalizations and doctor visits rise among previously uninsured individuals with hypertension, 
heart disease, diabetes, or stroke diagnosed before age 65.  
As is true for health insurance more generally (see Levy and Meltzer, 2004), it has 
proven more difficult to identify the health impacts of Medicare.
6  Most existing studies have 
                                                 
6 Currie and Gruber (1996a, 1996b) find  that Medicaid insurance for low-income pregnant women leads to 
improvements in health of newborns and a reduction in infant mortality.   6
focused on mortality as an indicator of health.
7  An early study by Lichtenberg (2001) used 
Social Security Administration (SSA) life table data to test for a trend-break in the age profile of 
mortality at age 65.  Although Lichtenberg identified a break, subsequent analysis by Dow 
(2004) showed that this is an artifact of the interval smoothing procedure used to construct the 
SSA life tables.  Comparisons based on unsmoothed data show no evidence of a shift at age 65 
(Card, Dobkin, Maestas, 2004).  Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) explore trends in state-
specific mortality rates for people over 65 relative to those under 65, testing for a break around 
1966 – the year Medicare was introduced.  They also examine the correlation between changes in 
relative mortality after 1966 and the fraction of elderly people in a region who were uninsured in 
1963.  Neither exercise suggests that the introduction of Medicare reduced the relative mortality 
of people over 65.  
 
III.  A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Health Outcomes 
Like earlier studies, we use comparisons around the age threshold for Medicare eligibility 
to measure the health impacts of the program. Unlike most existing studies, however, we attempt 
to isolate a sub-population whose immediate mortality experience is more likely to be affected 
by differences in health care services provided to people once they are eligible for Medicare.  
Specifically, we focus on people who are admitted to the hospital through the emergency room 
for relatively severe illnesses.  Any extra services offered to the Medicare-eligible subset of this 
population have at least a plausible chance of affecting short run mortality.  By comparison, 
                                                 
7 An exception is Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2004), where we look at age profiles of self-reported health status.  
These are relatively smooth around age 65.  Decker (2002) examines the outcomes of breast cancer patients pre- 
and post Medicare eligibility and finds some evidence of better outcomes for those over 65.   7
Medicare-induced services would have to have a very large impact on mortality to generate a 
detectable effect on a relatively healthy population.
8 
Our analysis is based on a reduced form regression-discontinuity (RD) model of the 
form: 
(1) yi  =  f(ai, α)  +  Post65i β  +  εi 
where yi represents a health-related outcome for patient i, ai represents the patient’s age 
(measured in days), f( ) is a function that is continuous at age 65 with parameters α (e.g., a 
flexible polynomial), Post65i  is an indicator for whether the patient has passed his or her 65th 
birthday, and εi is an error term reflecting the influence of all other factors.  If yi  is a measure of 
health care services provided to patient i, then we interpret β as a scaled estimate of the causal 
effect of Medicare coverage on the provision of services.   As in other “fuzzy” RD designs 
(Hahn, Todd, and van de Klauuw, 2001), the scale factor is just the difference in the probability 
of treatment on either side of the threshold, although in the case of Medicare, the treatment is 
potentially multi-dimensional (see section VI).
9   If yi  is an indicator for mortality over some 
time horizon, then we interpret β as a scaled estimate of the causal effect of Medicare coverage 
on the likelihood of death in that time interval.  
  We defer a detailed discussion of the possible channels leading to the reduced form 
impact of Medicare coverage on health care services to Section VI.  For now, we note that the 
data in Figure 1 suggest at least three alternatives: (1) an effect attributable to the increase in the 
overall fraction of the population with any health insurance; (2) an effect driven by people 
                                                 
8 For example, in a randomized trial in which Medicare were made available to a treatment group of 65 year olds 
and withheld from the controls, the program would have to have a 7% impact on annual mortality to detect a 
statistically significant effect in a one-year follow-up, even with 100,000 observations in each group.  The reason 
for the low power is that the baseline mortality rate of 65 year olds is only about 1.5% per year.    8
switching from an insurance carrier other than Medicare to a package that includes Medicare;
10   
(3) an effect attributable to the change from managed care coverage to indemnity insurance.  For 
example, hospitals may provide extra services if they know a patient is covered by Medicare and 
supplemental insurance, rather than being uninsured, or covered by a typical pre-65 policy.  
Alternatively, there may be a reduction in the delay in verifying insurance status for Medicare 
patients, or in receiving approval for certain procedures that are limited by managed care 
providers.  
As emphasized by Lee (2007), the key assumption underlying an RD analysis is that 
assignment to either side of the discontinuity threshold (in our context, to being observed just a 
few weeks older or younger than 65) is as good as random.  In the context of equation (1) this 
implies  
(2) E[  εi | 65−δ < ai < 65]  =  E[ εi | 65 ≤ ai < 65+δ ]     for δ sufficiently small , 
which ensures that a simple comparison of the mean of yi on either side of the age 65 threshold 
yields a consistent estimate of the parameter β. 
In a sample of hospital admittees the assumption that patients close to age 65 are “as 
good as randomly assigned” to either side of the age threshold may fail if insurance status affects 
the probability a patient is admitted to the hospital.  Since previous work has found that the onset 
of Medicare eligibility leads to an increase in hospitalization rates (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 
2007) this is a serious threat to an RD analysis of the health outcomes of patients.  Figure 2 
illustrates the difficulty using counts of hospital admissions based on California discharge 
records from 1992 to 2002.   (The sample is described more precisely below).  At age 65 the 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 See Imbens and Lemieux (2007) for an overview of recent work on regression-discontinuity methods.  The causal 
effect is only identified for the subset of people whose status is changed at age 65.   9
number of non-Emergency Room admissions jumps by approximately 12%, while the number of 
Emergency Room admissions rises by 3%.  Assuming that the additional patients are not as sick 
as those who would enter hospital regardless of Medicare eligibility, the average health of 
patients rises discretely at age 65. 
In this paper we attempt to solve the sample selection problem by focusing on a subset of 
patients who are admitted through the emergency room (ER) for a relatively severe set of 
conditions that require immediate hospitalization.  Specifically, we identify a set of admission 
diagnosis codes with similar ER admission rates on weekdays and weekends.
11  We then test the 
assumption that there is no remaining selection bias associated with the age 65 boundary by 
looking for discontinuities in the number of admissions at 65 and the characteristics of patients 
on either side of the boundary.  Importantly, our procedure for identifying an unselected sample 
is unrelated to the age of patients.  Thus, our tests for selection bias are unaffected by “pre-test 
bias,” and provide a reasonable degree of confidence in the validity of our inferences. 
As a check on inferences from this sample, we also use a simple bounding procedure 
(Horowitz and Manski, 1995) to estimate a lower bound (in magnitude) for the impact of 
Medicare eligibility on other patient samples, including the overall population of hospital 
admissions.  This bound is fairly tight because the relative size of the group of “extra” patients 
who only enter the hospital if they are over 65 is modest (at most 12%) and because the gap 
between actual mortality experience of all patients and the “worst case” bound for the extra 
patient group is small.  For example, the average 28-day mortality rate of all people admitted to 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 Arguably, one could break out this effect into an effect associated with Medicare coverage per se, and an effect 
associated with coverage by multiple policies. 
11 Hospital admissions are typically much lower on weekends than weekdays, in part because of staffing constraints.  
Dobkin (2003) shows that mortality rates for patients admitted on the weekend for diagnoses with a constant daily 
admission rate are the same as for patients admitted during the week.   10
the hospital who are just over 65 is 4.6%, whereas the lower bound on the mortality of the extra 
patients is 0.  As we discuss below, this means that the “worst case” bias created by the selective 
inflow of patients after 65 is −0.3 percent – a relatively small bias. 
Even if there is no differential selection around the discontinuity threshold, inferences 
from an RD design can be compromised if there are other factors that change at the threshold.  
One concern is retirement: 65 is a traditional retirement age, and studies have shown that health 
is affected by employment status (Ruhm, 2000).  Nevertheless, we believe the confounding 
effect of retirement is relatively minor.  First, as shown in Appendix Figure A, recent data show 
no discontinuity in the likelihood of working at exactly age 65.
12  Second, the admission 
diagnoses included in our non-deferrable sample are relatively severe, and would normally 
preclude an immediate return to work.  But the mortality gap we observe in this sample at age 65 
emerges within 7 days of initial admission to the hospital, and thus is unlikely to reflect 
differences in survival between people who return to work and those who do not. 
Another concern with the age 65 threshold is that recommended medical practices may 
change at this age.  Until recently, for example, U.S. government agencies recommended 
different influenza vaccination policies for people over and under 65 (Smith et al, 2006).  Again, 
however, we think this is unlikely to affect the characteristics or treatment of patients admitted 
through the ER for non-deferrable conditions.  
 
                                                 
12 This figure shows employment rates by quarter of age, using data from the 1992-2003 National Health Interview 
Surveys. The spike in retirement at age 65 has largely disappeared in the past two decades (von Wachter, 2002), 
reflecting the elimination of mandatory retirement and the availability of Social Security benefits at age 62.   11
IV. Sample Construction and Validation 
Our sample is drawn from the universe of records for patients discharged from hospitals 
regulated by the State of California between January 1, 1992 and December 31, 2002.  To be 
included in the sample patients must have been admitted; thus, those who were sent home after 
treatment in the emergency room do not appear in the sample.
13   As explained in the Data 
Appendix (available on request), we drop discharge records for patients admitted before January 
1, 1992, or on or after December 1, 2002, to avoid length-biased sampling problems. 
The discharge dataset includes basic patient information (month of discharge, age in days 
at the time of discharge, gender, race/ethnicity, and zip code of residence) as well as medical 
information, including the principal cause of admission (which we call the “admission 
diagnosis”), whether the admission was planned or unplanned, the route into the hospital (ER 
versus non-ER), the patient’s primary health insurance provider, the length of stay, and a list of 
all procedures performed in the hospital.  It also includes a scrambled version of the patient’s 
Social Security Number, which can be used to track patients who are transferred within or 
between hospitals, and to link mortality records.  The Data Appendix describes our procedures 
for consolidating the records for patients who were transferred to new units in the same hospital, 
or to another hospital.  It also describes the linked discharge-mortality file that we merge with 
the initial discharge file in order to determine the date of death for patients in the sample.  
One notable data issue is that approximately 5% of 64-year old patients in our sample 
have a missing SSN, compared with about 4% of those just over 65.  Given that the in-hospital 
mortality rate of patients with a missing SSN is much higher than that of patients with a valid 
SSN (10.4% v. 6.3%), we believe that the ability to match longer-term mortality outcomes for   12
1/5
th of this group once they reach 65 will tend to bias down any observed mortality 
improvements at 65.  In any case, in Section V.e we present evidence showing that the mortality 
effects we estimate are unlikely to have arisen mechanically as a result of merging procedures or 
selectively missing data. 
As discussed in the previous Section, a critical step in our analysis is to select a subset of 
patients whose admission to the hospital is independent of insurance status.  We do this by 
identifying a set of admission diagnosis codes (classified by 5-digit ICD-9) that have similar 
unplanned admission rates through the ER on weekdays and weekends.  Arguably, these 
diagnoses are “non-deferrable,” and patients with these conditions will present at the ER at the 
same rate just before and just after their 65
th birthday, irrespective of Medicare coverage. 
Figure 3 shows how the distribution of the fraction of weekend admissions for different 
diagnosis codes changes as we focus on more restrictive subsets of admissions.  The density for 
all admission diagnoses is centered on 0.24, far below the 2/7=0.29 rate expected if admissions 
were equally likely on weekends and weekdays.  Clearly, there are many ICD-9 codes with 
lower admission rates on the weekend than during the week.  The density for the subset of 
emergency admissions has a mode near 2/7 but is still skewed to the left, suggesting that even 
among ER admissions there are many diagnoses with an under-representation of weekend 
admits.   Finally, the spiked density in Figure 3 shows the distribution of the fraction of weekend 
admits among unplanned ER admits, limiting the set of ICD-9 codes to those for which the t-
statistic for a test of similar weekend and weekday admission rate (i.e., the fraction of weekend 
admits= 2/7) is less than 0.965.  This distribution is tightly centered around 2/7. 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 According to a national survey of hospitals conducted by the General Accounting Office (2003), approximately 
15% of the patients seen in an emergency room are admitted to the hospital.   13
Table 1 summarizes the 10 most common admission diagnoses codes in this subsample 
of 425,315 “non-deferrable” admissions.  The largest diagnosis category is obstructive chronic 
bronchitis with acute exacerbation. (This includes chronic bronchitis with emphysema, known as 
“chronic obstructive pulmonary disease” – a common diagnosis for smokers and ex-smokers).  
Patients with this condition have an average hospital stay of 6.23 days, an average of 1.21 
procedures performed during their stay, and a 4.7% 28-day mortality rate.  Most of the other 
relatively common admission codes result in even longer stays, more procedures, and a higher 
death rate.  On average, it appears that diagnoses with the same admission rates on weekdays and 
the weekend are extremely acute and often life-threatening. 
To test that patients’ inclusion in the “non-deferrable” admissions subsample is 
independent of whether they are under or over 65, we conducted a regression discontinuity 
analysis of the count of admissions by age.  This procedure is similar to the test of manipulation 
proposed by McCrary (2007), though we have a discrete running variable (age, measured in 
days) and we use a parametric rather than a non-parametric approach.  Figure 4 shows the age 
profiles of the log of the daily admission count for four groups of ER admissions, based on the 
magnitude of the t-statistic for the test of a constant weekday/weekend admission rate.   The 
groups of admission diagnoses with t-statistics in the top two quartiles (t>6.62, and 2.54<t<6.62) 
show clear evidence of a jump at age 65, whereas the age profile for diagnoses in our preferred 
group, with |t| < 0.965,  shows no visible evidence of an increase in admissions.   
Formal testing results are summarized in Table 2.  Each of the 6 panels in this table 
presents two different RD specifications for the log of the number of admissions by age (in days) 
of the admitted patient.  We focus on people between the ages of 60 and 70, resulting in 3,652 
observations – one for each potential value of age in days.  Both specifications include a dummy   14
for age over 65 and a quadratic polynomial fully interacted with the post-65 dummy.  We have 
also fit the models with cubic polynomials and found no significant differences in the estimated 
values of the post-65 effects (see Appendix Table B). 
A limitation of our data set is that although we know each patient’s age in days at the 
time of admission, we do not know birthdates or exact admission dates.
14  Since Medicare 
eligibility begins on the first day of the month that a person turns 65, people who are admitted in 
the period up to 31 days before reaching their 65
th birthday may or may not be eligible for 
Medicare.  Appendix Figure C shows the fraction of admitted patients in our non-deferrable 
sample who are recorded as having Medicare as their primary insurance provider, by age in days 
for a narrow window around age 65.  This fraction is relatively flat for people up to a month 
before their 65
th birthday, then rises linearly in the 31 days before reaching age 65, as would be 
expected given Medicare eligibility rules and a uniform distribution of birthdates.   
Because we do not know the Medicare eligibility status of patients who are admitted 
within 31 days of their 65
th birthday, the second specification reported in each panel of Table 2 
includes a dummy for these observations.  The addition of this dummy has relatively little impact 
on the estimated coefficients.
15  Looking at the first two panels, we estimate that non-ER and 
planned ER admissions rise by about 12% at 65, while unplanned ER admissions rise by 2.5%.  
The remaining four panels report the results for the four quartiles of unplanned ER admissions 
shown in Figure 4.  As suggested by the graph, the estimated models show no discernable rise in 
admissions for our preferred subgroup of diagnoses with the lowest t-statistic for the comparison 
between weekday and weekend admission rates.  
                                                 
14 This restriction was imposed by the California Department of Health and Human Services as a condition for 
access to the discharge files.   15
We have also checked for discontinuities in the case mix and demographic composition 
of the non-deferrable subsample at age 65.  Tests for jumps in the racial composition, gender, 
and fraction of Saturday or Sunday admissions (available on request) are all far below 
conventional critical values.  To increase the power to detect differences in patient health, we 
used all the available covariates for an admission (including age, race/ethnicity, gender, year, 
month, and day of admission, and admission diagnosis fixed effects) to fit linear probability 
models for mortality over 7, 14, 28, 90 and 365 days.  We then took the predicted mortality rates 
from these models and conducted an RD analysis, looking for any evidence that the mortality 
characteristics shift at age 65.  The results for 7-day and 28-day predicted mortality are shown in 
Appendix Figure D. (Results for other windows are very similar and are available on request).  
The age profiles of predicted probability are extremely smooth, and show no jump at age 65.  In 
an RD specification with a quadratic in age and a dummy for over 65, interacted with the linear 
and quadratic terms, the t-statistics for the post-65 coefficient are 0.4 (7 day mortality) and 0.25 
(28 day mortality), providing no evidence that the observable health of the sample changes at age 
65.  In light of these testing results, we proceed under the assumption that patient health in the 
non-deferrable subsample trends smoothly at age 65.  
 
V. Shifts in Insurance, Health Services, and Mortality at 65 
a. Insurance  
We now turn to the impact of the Medicare eligibility age on health-related outcomes. 
We begin by looking at health insurance coverage.  Figure 5 shows the age profiles of the 
fractions of people with various primary insurers (private, Medicaid, Medicare, other, and none) 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 The bottom row of each sub-panel shows the p-value for a test that this additional variable has no effect.  In all six   16
in the non-deferrable admissions subsample.  Consistent with the patterns in Figure 1 for the 
overall population, we see a big increase in the fraction of patients with Medicare as their 
primary insurer at 65, coupled with a decline in the fraction with no insurance.  RD models for 
health insurance outcomes are presented in Table 3.  This table has the same format as Table 2, 
although we now include a set of covariates (year, month and day of admission, race/ethnicity, 
gender, and admission diagnosis fixed effects) in the specifications in columns 2 and 3 of each 
panel.  For reference, the specification in the first column excludes these controls and also 
excludes the dummy for admissions in the 31 days before a patient’s 65
th birthday.
16   
The regression results confirm the visual impressions conveyed in Figure 5.  At age 65, 
the fraction of patients with Medicare as their primary insurer rises by about 47 percentage 
points, while the fractions with private insurance and Medicaid both fall.
17  Note that in the 
sample of non-deferrable admissions the Medicare coverage rate at age 64 is 24%, substantially 
higher than in the overall population (shown in Figure 1).  Presumably this reflects the fact that 
many of these patients are chronically ill and on DI prior to 65.  The fraction with no insurance at 
64 is correspondingly a little lower than in the overall population (10% versus about 13%), and 
the reduction in the rate of non-insurance at 65 is a little smaller (-8% in the nondeferrable 
subsample, versus -9.5% for the population as a whole).  Nevertheless, as in the population as a 
whole, patients with non-deferrable conditions have much different insurance coverage just after 
age 65 than just before. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
panels the p-value is well above the usual critical value. 
16 As in Table 2, the bottom row of each sub-panel shows the p-value for a test of joint significance of the additional 
variables included in the specification in column 2 (relative to column 1) and in column 4 (relative to column 3). 
17 Unfortunately we have no information on secondary coverage. We suspect that many of the 45% who have 
private coverage prior to age 65 enroll in Medicare and a supplementary policy at 65.   17
b. Services 
We have three basic measures of patient services: length of stay, number of procedures 
performed, and total hospital list charges.
18  Figure 6 shows the age profiles for these measures, 
while Table 4 presents RD models similar to the specifications in Table 3.  The age profile for 
mean length of stay is somewhat noisier than the other two profiles, but all three profiles suggest 
an upward jump at 65.  The estimation results in Table 4 show that mean length of stay increases 
by 0.4 days (or about 4.5%) at 65, though the estimated gain is only marginally significant.  
Similarly, the number of procedures jumps by 0.1, or approximately 4% (with a t-ratio around 4), 
while log list charges jump by 3 percent (with a t-ratio of around 3).   These increases, although 
modest in size, are consistent with the findings in earlier work, and confirm that the onset of 
Medicare eligibility leads to increased use of medical services.  Importantly, we are finding these 
increases for a sample of acutely ill patients arriving at the hospital for emergency treatment, 
rather than for elective procedures (as in Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2007) or preventive care 
screenings (as in Decker and Rapaport, 2002, or McWilliams et al., 2003). 
We also performed a more detailed analysis of the changes in the use of specific 
procedures at age 65 for two major sets of diagnoses: obstructive chronic bronchitis with acute 
exacerbation (the largest ICD-9 in our non-deferrable sample, shown in row 1 of Table 1); and 
acute myocardial infarction (AMI), which combines the various detailed AMI diagnoses in our 
non-deferrable sample.  The results are summarized in Table 5.  Looking first at AMI, we see a 
relatively large and precisely estimated increase in the overall number of procedures at age 65 (a 
rise of  0.44 on a base rate of 5.0 among 64 year-olds, or approximately 9%) and significant 
                                                 
18 We sum the duration of stay, list charges, and number of procedures for all consecutive stays. List charges are 
accounting charges, and do not represent the charges actually billed to insurers or patients.  They also exclude   18
increases of about 4% in the use of several important diagnostic procedures, including coronary 
arteriography, cardiac catheterization, and angiocardiography.
19  In contrast, for obstructive 
chronic bronchitis patients, we see no change in the overall number of procedures, and small 
increases or decreases in the incidence of specific procedures.  This analysis suggests that the 
relatively small increase in the overall number of procedures for all admission diagnoses in Table 
4 is masking larger increases for certain “procedure intensive” diagnoses, like AMI, and near 
constancy for other diagnoses.  Unfortunately, the sample sizes for other diagnoses are too small 
to permit a more extensive investigation.  We conclude, however, that the onset of Medicare 
eligibility is associated with an increase in the use of specific potentially life-saving procedures. 
 
c. Transfers 
Patients who are initially admitted for acute care may be transferred (i.e., discharged and 
immediately re-admitted) to another care/treatment unit in the same hospital, to another hospital, 
or to non-hospital care (e.g., nursing homes).
20  Because our data are derived from hospital 
discharge records, we cannot measure transfers to stand-alone skilled nursing facilities (SNF’s) 
or to other care options that may be substitutable with post-acute care in a hospital setting.  
Nevertheless, it is interesting to ask whether Medicare eligibility is associated with any change in 
the likelihood of patient transfer to other care units in the same hospital, or to a second hospital. 
  Figure 7 shows the age profiles of these two outcomes.  Both within- and between-
                                                                                                                                                             
charges for physician services, and are not reported for patients at Kaiser-run hospitals.  We interpret list charges 
as a convenient “price-weighted” summary of services rendered, albeit at somewhat artificial prices. 
19 Cutler and McClellan (2001) have estimated that invasive diagnosis and treatment procedures as a whole 
(including catheterization, angioplasty, and bypass surgery) are cost-effective in the treatment of AMI.  The 
efficacy of specific procedures is less clear: see e.g., McClellan, McNeil and Newhouse (1994) and Cutler, 
McClellan and Newhouse (1999)  
20 Note that to avoid double counting we have collapsed all consecutive hospital stays to a single record.   19
hospital transfer rates rise at age 65, with a particularly large rise in within-hospital transfers.  
Corresponding RD regression models are presented in the upper panel of Table 6, and confirm 
that the within-hospital transfer rate rises by about 1 percentage point (on a base level of about 
4% among 64 year olds) once patients are over 65.   
Further analysis (not shown) indicates that the rise in within-hospital transfers at 65 is 
driven by a jump in the transfer rate to skilled nursing facilities (SNF’s) in the same hospital.  
Until 1998, post-acute care delivered in skilled nursing facilities, rehabilitation units, and home 
health care agencies was reimbursed on a cost-basis, whereas acute care was covered by 
prospective payments (Cotterill and Gage, 2002).  Newhouse (1996, 2002) argues that the more 
generous reimbursement system for post-acute care contributed to the rapid growth in SNF’s 
(both within hospitals and in free-standing units), and to a relatively high rate of transfer of 
Medicare patients to SNF’s following their initial hospitalization.  The discontinuity in within-
hospital transfers at age 65 is consistent with this argument.  
Medicare reimbursement for post-acute care was switched to a prospective payment 
system in 1998, leading to a sharp reversal in the growth rate of hospital-based SNF’s (Dalton 
and Howard, 2002).  To check whether this change led to a shift in the transfer rate of Medicare 
patients to hospital-based SNF’s, we estimated separate RD models for within- and between-
hospital transfers for 1992-98 period and the 1999-2002 period.  Although the RD in between 
hospital transfers is essentially the same in the two period, the RD in within-hospital rates falls 
substantially, from 1.2 percentage points in the pre-1998 period (standard error 0.3) to 0.6 
percentage points in the post-1998 period (standard error 0.3). This provides further confirmation 
that hospitals were responding to the payment incentives in the pre-1998 system by transferring   20
patients to hospital-based SNF’s, and that the elimination of these incentives led to reduced use 
of hospital-based SNF’s for Medicare patients. 
Finally, Figure 8 and the RD models in the lower panel of Table 6 address the likelihood 
that a patient is re-admitted to the hospital (after at least 1 day out of the hospital).  This outcome 
could be interpreted as a measure of the “quality” of treatment in the initial hospital stay, 
although this interpretation is clouded by the impact of Medicare eligibility on mortality (since 
people who die cannot be readmitted). We focus on re-admission within 7 and 28 days of 
discharge.  The figures suggest that the readmission rate after 7 days is relatively flat through the 
age 65 threshold, while the readmission rate after 28 days drops significantly.  The RD models 
suggest that the 28-day readmission rate is about 0.6% lower for people just over 65, though the 
sampling error is relatively large.  We return to discuss this impact in more detail after we have 
presented the mortality impacts in the next subsection. 
 
d. Mortality 
  Figure 9 plots the age profiles for the probability of death within 7, 14, 28, 90, 180, and 
365 days of admission to the hospital, while Table 7 presents estimates from the RD regression 
models corresponding to each of these outcomes.  Inspection of Figure 9 shows that each of the 
mortality measures shows a drop on the order of 1 percentage point at age 65.  The regression 
estimates in Table 7 confirm this: we observe a reduction in 7-day mortality of about 1 
percentage point which persists over the longer follow-up periods.  The effect is relatively 
precisely measured in the shortest time intervals but has an increasing sampling error as the 
follow-up window is extended, yielding t-ratios of about 5 at 7 days, about 3 at 28 days, and 
around 1.8 at 365 days.  Figure 10 shows the estimated post-65 coefficients from RD regression   21
models at all possible follow-up windows from 1 day to 2 years, along with the associated 95% 
confidence intervals.
21  The estimated mortality effect of Medicare eligibility on our sample of 
non-deferrable admissions is relatively stable at about 1 percentage point over the entire range of 
follow-up periods.   
  Our estimate of the mortality effect of Medicare eligibility is relatively large: it represents 
a 20% reduction in 7-day mortality, a 9% reduction in 28-day mortality, and a 3-4% reduction in 
1-year mortality relative to death rates among 64 year olds with similar conditions at admission.  
The fact that the effect emerges within 7 days and persists for two years suggests that the extra 
services or changes in the quality of services provided to Medicare-eligible admittees have an 
immediate life-saving effect, and lead to a significant gain in the duration of life. 
  It is worth noting that the mortality reductions estimated in Table 7 appear to reflect 
changes in the treatment of patients with Medicare within the same hospital, rather than patient 
sorting to higher-quality hospitals at 65.  The fractions of patients entering different kinds of 
hospitals show only small changes at age 65.  The largest change is a reduction of about 3 
percentage points in the fraction of non-deferrable admissions entering county hospitals.  
Interestingly, the 28-day mortality rate for 63-64 year olds is actually lower at county hospitals 
(6.8%) than at non-profit (9.2%), for-profit (9.0%), or district hospitals (9.7%) in our data, so it 
is implausible that such a small shift in patients out of these hospitals could have much affect on 
average mortality.
22  Thus, it does not appear that Medicare reduces mortality by shifting patients 
to better hospitals.   
                                                 
21 These estimates are from our base specification with no additional controls (i.e., the first specification in each 
panel of Table 7). 
22 To see that the effect of a small amount of sorting is negligible, note that even if (contrary to fact) the mortality 
rate at county hospitals were 50 percent larger than that of private hospitals, it could account for at most a 
negligible amount of the estimated mortality gain: 0.03*0.045=0.00135 percentage points.   22
  In view of the relatively large mortality effects associated with Medicare eligibility, it is 
worth re-considering the estimated impacts on hospital re-admission rates.  A re-admission at 
some time interval (say 28 days) can only be observed if the patient is still alive:  i.e.,  
  P(re-admission) = P(re-admission|alive) × P(alive).   
At age 64, the average 28-day death rate for our sample of non-deferrable patients is 9.8%, while 
the unconditional re-admission rate after 28 days is 17.1%. This implies that the re-admission 
rate for people just under 64, conditional on being alive after 28 days, is 18.96%.  Our estimated 
RD models show a drop in the unconditional readmission rate of -0.63% (Table 6, 4
th panel. 
specification (3)), and a drop in the mortality rate of -0.9% (Table 7, 3
rd panel, specification (3)).  
Adding these to the base rates at age 64, the conditional re-admission rate for living patients rises 
to 18.08% at age 65.  Thus, correcting for the bias caused by mortality, the implied effect of 
Medicare eligibility on the 28-day conditional re-admission rate is -0.88% -- 40% larger (in 
absolute value) than the impact on the unconditional re-admission rate.  This is a relatively large 
impact and suggests that Medicare eligibility not only reduces mortality but also morbidity 
among surviving patients. 
 
e. Robustness of Mortality Estimates 
  To further probe our estimated mortality effects we used a simple bounding procedure to 
obtain lower-bound estimates of the (absolute) mortality effect of Medicare eligibility on broader 
samples of hospital admissions, including the entire patient population.  The basis of this 
procedure is the observation that in any sample of sick people close to age 65 there are two 
subgroups: one group (which we index with subscript 1) who enter the hospital regardless of 
whether they are Medicare eligible or not; and a second group (indexed by subscript 2) who will   23
only enter the hospital if they are over 65.  Let α ≥ 0 represent the sample fraction of the second 
group.  We have argued that among people with non-deferrable conditions, α = 0.  In more 
general patient populations, however, α >0, and a comparison of mortality between patients just 
over and just under 65 contains a selectivity bias. 
 Let  m1 denote the mortality rate of the first group if they enter the hospital just before 
their 65
th birthday and let m1′ denote the mortality rate if they enter after 65.  The causal effect of 
Medicare eligibility for group 1 is Δ = m1′- m1.  The observed mortality rate of the patient 
population who are just over 65 is an average for groups 1 and 2: 
 m ⎯  =  (1-α)m1′  + αm2  =  (1-α)( m1 + Δ )  +  αm2  , 
where m2 is the post-65 mortality rate of group 2.  Using this expression it is easy to show that: 
(3) m ⎯ − m1   =   Δ   −  α/(1−α) × ( m ⎯  − m2 )  . 
Thus, the mortality differential between the post-65 patient population and the pre-65 patient 
population is equal to Δ, the causal effect of Medicare eligibility on group 1, plus a bias term: 
  Bias   =  −  α/(1−α) × ( m ⎯  − m2 ) , 
which depends on the fraction of group 2, and the deviation of their post-65 mortality rate from 
the average of groups 1 and 2.   Since m2 > 0, a lower bound on the absolute value of the bias 
caused by the presence of group 2 in the post-65 patient population is  
(4)  Worst-case Bias =  −α/(1−α) × m ⎯ . 
This bias tends to 0 as α→0, and is proportional to m ⎯ .   
  Table 8 presents estimates of the various terms in equation (3) for the 28-day mortality 
rate of various patient populations, including all patients (column 1); those who enter the hospital 
via a route other than the emergency room, or for a planned hospitalization (which we call 
“elective” admissions, in column 2); those who enter via the ER for an unplanned hospitalization   24
(column 3); and the four subgroups of the unplanned-ER group, based on admission diagnoses 
with different ranges of weekend versus weekday admissions (i.e., the four subgroups graphed in 
Figure 4) in columns 4-7.  The first row of Table 8 presents the estimated RD in the log of the 
number of hospital admissions at age 65, which is an estimate of α/(1−α).
23   Row 2 shows the 
estimated change in the mortality rate of patients at age 65 (i.e., the estimate of m ⎯ − m1), 
obtained from a RD model with an interacted quadratic function of age fit to aggregated 
mortality rates by age in days.
24  Row 3 shows an estimate of the constant in the mortality 
regression, which is our estimate of the mortality rate for people just under 65.  (The implied 
estimate of m ⎯  is therefore the sum of the entries in rows 2 and 3).   Row 4 shows our estimate of 
the worst-case selectivity bias, based on equation (4), while row 5 shows our lower bound 
estimate of the effect of Medicare eligibility on the patient population, and row 6 shows an 
estimated sampling error for this bound. Finally, for reference, row 7 shows the fraction of 
patients in each subgroup.  
Three key conclusions emerge from the table.  First, the lower-bound estimate of the 
overall effect of Medicare on the 28 day death rate of the entire patient population is -0.13% (and 
only marginally significant).  This is about one-tenth as large as our estimate of the effect on the 
non-deferrable admission group, who represent 12% of the overall patient population.  Second, 
for “elective” admissions (column 2), our point estimate of the lower bound mortality effect is 
actually positive (as it is for the top quartile of diagnoses with lowest weekend admission rates in 
                                                 
23 If α is the share of all potential patients who are only admitted after age 65, then the proportional increase in 
admissions at age 65 is (1 – (1- α))/(1-α)  =  α/(1-α), so the RD in log admissions is an estimate of α/(1-α). 
24 To construct a standard error for our lower bound we need to construct a standard error for Δ + α/(1- α) m ⎯ , where 
Δ is the estimated RD in mortality, α/(1- α) is the estimated RD in log admissions, and m ⎯  is the estimated 
mortality rate for those just over 65, which can be estimated as the constant in the mortality regression (assuming 
age is normalized to 0 at age 65) plus the value of the RD in mortality.  Since we need the covariance between the   25
column 5).  For these admissions we cannot rule out that selection bias explains the entire 
(relatively small) drop in mortality we see after age 65.  Even for the two middle quartiles of 
weekend/weekday admission codes the estimated lower bounds on the Medicare effect are small.  
Thus, virtually all of the (lower bound) mortality effect we observe for the overall patient sample 
is attributable to the reduction in mortality for the non-deferrable subgroup.   
  A third observation is that the unadjusted change in mortality at age 65 for the top 
quartile diagnosis group (column 4) is actually positive (+0.27%).  This is reassuring in two 
ways.  First, it proves there is no mechanical data problem that is causing us to measure lower 
death rates for all patients over 65.
25  Second, the diagnoses in this quartile are relatively non-
life-threatening.  In particular, the 28-day mortality rate for 64- year-old patients in this group is 
only 2.7%, somewhat below the death rate for patients admitted on an elective basis.  It would be 
surprising if Medicare eligibility had much effect on mortality for such a relatively healthy 
group, and the estimates imply that it does not.   
 
VI. Discussion  
  Our empirical results point to a significant positive effect of Medicare eligibility on the 
intensity of treatment for acutely ill patients with non-deferrable conditions, a negative effect on 
re-admission rates, and a negative effect on patient mortality.  In this section we discuss the 
possible channels for this effect.  To aid in this discussion it is helpful to consider a simplified 
causal model in which Medicare eligibility affects insurance characteristics, insurance affects 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimated parameters from the mortality and admissions models, we fit the two RD’s as seemingly unrelated 
regressions using grouped age cells, and use the delta method to construct the sampling error. 
25 We believe that any such data problems are likely to bias the results in the opposite direction.  In particular, 
because the in-hospital mortality rate of people without SSNs is higher, at worst we would add to the sample at 65   26
health care services, and health services affect mortality.  Building on the analysis in Section II, 
suppose that patient i has a health insurance package with a vector of characteristics zi, including 
whether i has any coverage, whether he or she has Medicare or some other form of primary 
coverage, and (possibly) other characteristics.  Assume the age profile for zi is generated by a 
model of the form: 
 (5)  zi   =    g(ai, γz)  +  Post65i π  +  υzi , 
where g is a smooth function of age (ai) with parameters γz, υzi is an error term that is mean-
independent of the dummy Post65i, and π represents the vector of discontinuities in insurance 
characteristics at age 65.  Suppose that health care services delivered to patient i, (Si) depend on 
age, an error term υsi, and the characteristics of the insurance package:
 26 
 (6)  Si    =  h(ai, γs)  +  θ′zi   +  υsi . 
Finally, assume the likelihood of death of patient i (yi=1) depends on age and on health services: 
 (7)  yi   =  k(ai, γs)  +  λ Si  +  υyi  . 
Equations (5), (6) and (7) yield reduced form models like equation (1), with a discontinuity in 
health care services at age 65 equal to  
 (8a)  βs  =  θ′π , 
and a discontinuity in mortality equal to: 
 (8b)  βy  =  λ θ′π . 
  In this simplified setup, each element of the insurance package represents a separate 
“channel” that contributes additively to the reduced form effects on services and mortality.  For 
example, the k
th element of zi contributes θk πk to the RD in services and  λ θk πk  to the RD in 
                                                                                                                                                             
a small group with higher potential mortality, which would lead to a rise in the measured death rate for people over 
65.    27
mortality.   Unfortuntately, we have no information on the individual components of θ, and only 
limited information on the vector π of insurance changes at age 65.  For example, we do not 
observe secondary coverage, or whether the primary insurance is managed care.  Nevertheless, it 
is possible to shed some light on the mortality effect associated with one key insurance 
characteristic: whether the patient has any insurance coverage or none.  
  In particular, note that the maximum contribution of the “any coverage” channel cannot 
exceed πc (the jump in coverage at 65) times the average mortality rate of uninsured 64-year 
olds, because the extension of coverage to the previously uninsured group can only reduce their 
mortality rate to 0.  The average 7-day mortality rate of uninsured patients who are just under 65 
years of age in our nondeferrable admission subsample is 0.05, while πc=0.08 (Table 3).  Thus 
the maximum reduction in mortality attributable to the reduction in the number of people with no 
health insurance is 0.004 – about 40% of the 7-day mortality effect we estimate.  This is an 
extreme bound because it is based on the assumption that none of the previously uninsured 
would die if they were covered.  A more plausible bound is that insurance coverage reduces the 
death rate by no more than one-half: in this case the “any coverage” channel can explain at most 
20% of the total mortality effect. 
  In principle we can gain some additional insight by comparing changes in health 
insurance, the intensity of treatment, and mortality for different subgroups of patients.
27   
Unfortunately, the limited demographic variables in our discharge data make this a challenging 
exercise.  Comparisons across race/ethnicity groups are uninformative, because the sample sizes 
                                                                                                                                                             
26 This equation simplifies health care services to a single dimension.  In fact, changes in insurance can cause some 
types of services to rise and use of other services to fall (or stay constant). 
27 In particular, assume that π varies by subgroup, with a value of π(g) for subgroup g.  If  the parameters λ and θ are 
constant across groups then the discontinuity in services for group g is θ′π(g) and the discontinuity in mortality is λ   28
for blacks (n=41,000) and Hispanics (n=66,280) are too small to obtain useful estimates.  We 
also tried dividing patients into two groups based on the average fraction of 55-64 year-old 
patients from the same zip code who had no insurance coverage.  Even here, we were unable to 
estimate systematic differences in the changes in treatment intensity or mortality outcomes at age 
65 between residents from “low insurance” and “high insurance” zip codes.  (Results are 
available on request).  We do find significant increases in the numbers of procedures and 
significant reductions in mortality even for patients from the high-insurance zip codes (who have 
only a very small gain in the probability of insurance coverage at age 65), suggesting that a 
increase in insurance coverage per se is not the explanation for the impacts of Medicare.   
  Instead, we suspect that the measured mortality effects arise because Medicare imposes 
fewer restrictions than private insurance or Medicaid, leading to more (and possibly higher-
quality) services to Medicare patients.  This interpretation is similar to the conclusion reached in 
Card, Dobkin, and Maestas (2007), where we note that Medicare eligibility leads to increases in 
hospitalization rates for a wide range of procedures, with bigger increases for whites than blacks 
or Hispanics, even though whites tend to have higher rates of insurance coverage prior to age 65. 
  
VII. Summary and Conclusions 
  A longstanding question in health economics is whether health insurance affects health.  
This question is particularly relevant for Medicare, the largest medical insurance program in the 
country, which provides nearly universal coverage to people once they turn 65.  We focus on 
measuring the health effects of Medicare eligibility for a relatively sick population – specifically, 
people who are admitted to the hospital through the emergency room with diagnoses that have 
                                                                                                                                                             
θ′π(g).  By comparing the relative sizes of the discontinuities in insurance, treatment intensity, and mortality across   29
similar admission rates on weekdays and weekends.  In contrast to elective hospitalizations, there 
is no jump in these “non-deferrable” hospital admissions at age 65.  Moreover, the predicted 
mortality rate of admitted patients (based on demographics and admission diagnoses) trends 
smoothly.  These findings suggest that the underlying health of patients admitted with non-
deferrable conditions is very similar whether the patients are just under or just over 65. 
  In light of this conclusion, we use a regression discontinuity approach to measure the 
impacts of reaching age 65 on the intensity of treatment in the hospital, and on mortality for up 
to two years after the hospital admission.  We find modest but statistically significant increases 
in several measures of treatment intensity at age 65, including the number of procedures 
performed in hospital, total list charges, and the likelihood of transfer to other care units in the 
hospital.   Associated with these changes we find relatively large reductions in patient mortality 
at age 65.  Medicare eligibility reduces 7-day mortality by about 1 percentage point, with similar 
sized reductions at 14 days, 28 days, 90 days, and through the end of our follow-up period.  We 
probe the robustness of these findings by using a bounding procedure to evaluate the lower-
bound effect of Medicare eligibility on the entire hospital patient population.  The bounds for the 
overall population are consistent with the magnitude of the effect we estimate for patients with 
non-deferrable conditions, providing further credence to our basic results. 
  The magnitude of the estimated mortality effect of Medicare eligibility is too large to be 
driven solely by changes among the 8% of the patient population who move from no health 
insurance coverage to Medicare when they reach 65.  Instead, our findings point to a more 
widespread effect of Medicare on treatment intensity and mortality, including patients who were 
insured prior to 65.   We argue that this pattern is consistent with an “insurance generosity” 
                                                                                                                                                             
subgroups it is possible to judge whether the data are consistent with a “1-channel” explanation.    30
channel,  reflecting increased services (or the more timely delivery of services) for patients who 
are covered by Medicare and supplemental insurance relative to the typical insurance package 
held by people just under 65.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the reduction in mortality is achieved with only a modest 
rise in hospital list charges (around 4%).  This is an incomplete measure of the total cost increase 
associated with Medicare eligibility because it excludes doctor bills and charges for other non-
hospital personnel.  If these unobserved costs also rose by 4% we suspect that the implied cost-
benefit analysis for making Medicare available to people admitted for non-deferrable conditions 
would be very favorable.  However, Medicare eligibility also leads to large increases in the use 
of services by other, less sick, patients for whom the effects on mortality are very small, or even 
zero.  Whether the overall cost of the system is justified by the gains in health therefore remains 
an important issue for further research.   31
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Any Insurance Any Insurance Fitted
Managed Care Managed Care Fitted
Have Medicare Have Medicare Fitted
Multiple Policies Multiple Policies Fitted
Any Insurance: + 9.7% (0.5)
Have Medicare: + 64.5% (0.7)
Multiple Policies: + 47.3% (1.0)
Managed Care: − 30.8% (1.1)Notes: The points are the log of the average admission count. The fitted values are from regressions that include a second order polynomial in age fully interacted with a dummy for age >= 65 
and a dummy variable for the month before people turn 65.





























ER Admission  ER Admission Fitted
Non ER admission  Non ER admission FittedNotes: To create the figures above we computed the proportion of patients admitted on the weekend for each ICD-9. We then computed the KDE of the weekend admissions proportions over 
the ICD-9s. We repeated the process for admissions through the ER.










0.171 0.186 0.201 0.217 0.232 0.247 0.262 0.278 0.293 0.308 0.323 0.339 0.354 0.369 0.385 0.400 0.415








ER Admissions for ICD-9s With No Selection In
Favor of Weekday AdmissionsNotes: See notes from Figure 2. For the sample of ER admissions the age profiles above are created by computing the t-statistic for the test that an ICD-9 has a weekend to weekday ratio of 
2:5. The admissions into quartiles based on the t-statistic.



























































































































































































































t-stat 2.54-6.62 t-stat 2.54-6.62 Fitted
t-stat 0.96-2.54    t-stat 0.96-2.54 Fitted 
t-stat 0-0.96    t-stat 0-0.96 Fitted 
t-stat above 6.62 t-stat above 6.62 FittedNotes: Coverage is the expected primary payers. These figures are derived from the 425,315 admissions that show no evidence of selection.





































e Private Private Fitted
Medicare Medicare Fitted
Medicaid Medicaid Fitted
Other Insurance Other Insurance Fitted
Uninsured Uninsured fittedNotes: See notes from Figure 2. Charges are unavailable for 13.4% of the sample. At age 65 there is a discrete 0.6% decrease in the number of records where charges are unavailable. 
Individuals without a SSN have been dropped.































































Log Charges Log Charges Fitted
Length of Stay Length of Stay Fitted
Procedures Procedures FittedNotes: Inidividuals without SSNs are not included in the figure as they can't be tracked.
























Transfer Across Hospital Fitted
Transfer Within Hospital
Transfer Within Hospital FittedNotes: See notes from Figure 5. Days to readmission are computed from date of discharge. Individuals without a SSN have been dropped.























n Readmit 28 Days
Readmit 28 Days Fitted
Readmission 7 Days
Readmit 7 Days FittedNotes: See notes from Figure 5. These deaths are coded based on death certificate data. They are linked to the hospital records based on SSN. Records without SSNs were dropped.




















Death 365 Days Death 365 Days Fitted
Death 180 Days Death 180 Days Fitted
Death 90 Days Death 90 Days Fitted
Death 28 Days  Death 28 Days Fitted
Death 14 Days Death 14 Days Fitted
Death 7 Days  Death 7 Days FittedNotes: Evolution of RDD and 95 percent confidence interval. Due to how the datasets were merged there is substantial censoring of deaths occurring more than 2 years after admission.
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Obstructive chronic bronchitis with acute exacerbation 491.21 61,558 6.23 1.21 23,835 2.8 4.7
Respiratory failure 518.81 24,328 13.67 3.70 65,459 9.5 22.5
Acute myocardial infarction of other inferior wall first episode 410.41 21,192 7.23 5.13 52,798 26.0 6.9
Acute myocardial infarction of other anterior wall first episode 410.11 15,727 7.82 5.31 56,684 24.6 10.6
Intracerebral hemorrhage 431 10,755 17.77 3.63 61,870 15.0 29.6
Chronic airway obstruction, not elsewhere classified 496 9,102 6.46 1.47 18,868 3.1 7.7
Fracture of neck of femur Intertrochanteric section 820.21 6,868 14.15 2.66 39,614 9.8 2.9
Cerebral artery occlusion, unspecified 434.9 5,782 15.15 3.68 26,863 14.1 8.1
Convulsions unknown Cause 780.39 5,338 5.13 1.25 21,850 4.2 3.1
Asthma, unspecified with status asthmaticus 493.91 5,095 4.61 1.09 15,651 1.7 0.9
Note: Length of stay, procedure count and hospital list charges are totals for all sequential hospital stays.
  Table 2: Changes in Admissions at Age 65 for California Hospital Admissions 1992-2002
Non ER or Planned ER and Unplanned
Age Over 65 (x100) 11.9 12.0 2.4 2.6
[0.5] [0.5] [0.5] [0.5]
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y N Y
Observations 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652
R-Squared 0.87 0.87 0.81 0.81
P-Value 0.16 0.28
Weekend t-stat > 6.62 Weekend t-stat 2.54-6.62
Age Over 65 (x100) 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.7
[1.0] [1.1] [0.9] [1.0]
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y N Y
Observations 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652
R-Squared 0.39 0.39 0.54 0.54
P-Value 0.76 0.56
Weekend t-stat 0.96-2.54 Weekend t-stat < 0.96
Age Over 65 (x100) 2.7 3.0 0.6 0.6
[0.9] [1.0] [0.9] [0.9]
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y   N Y
Observations 3,652 3,652  3,652 3,652
R-Squared 0.63 0.63 0.52 0.52
P-Value 0.20 0.85
Notes: Standard errors in square brackets. Table reports coefficient estimates from models fit to data on log number of admissions by 
single day of age. Sample is restricted to people admitted from home to California hospitals between January 1, 1992 and November 
30, 2002. All models include a quadratic polynomial in age, fully interacted with a dummy for age over 65. Dummy for just under 65 is 
set to 1 for people admitted in the 31 days before their 65th birthday. P-values reported in column 2 of each sub-panel are for the test 
that the coefficient of the dummy for just under 65 is equal to zero.Table 3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Changes in Insurance Coverage
Medicare Uninsured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Over 65 (x100) 43.9 47.6 47.5 45.8 -7.4 -8.1 -8.0 -7.9
[0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.6] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3]
Year/Month/Sat/Sun N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Race and Gender N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Condition FE N N Y Y N N Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N N N Y N N N Y
Mean Age 64-65 (x100) 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.7
Observations 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Private Medicaid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Over 65 (x100) -24.8 -26.9 -26.8 -26.0 -10.1 -10.9 -10.8 -9.8
[0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.6] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.35]
Year/Month/Sat/Sun N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Race and Gender N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Condition FE N N Y Y N N Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N N N Y N N N Y
Mean Age 64-65 (x100) 43.3 43.3 43.3 43.3 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5
Observations 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315 425,315
P-Value  0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in square brackets. Table reports coefficient estimates from linear probability models fit to data on sample of 
people admitted from home to California hospitals between January 1, 1992 and November 30, 2002. All models include a quadratic 
polynomial in age, fully interacted with a dummy for age over 65. Dummy for just under 65 is set to 1 for people admitted to the hospital 
in the 31 days before their 65th birthday. Race and gender represent dummies for race/ethnicity and gender. Condition FE represents a 
set of fixed effects for primary admission diagnosis. Mean age 64-65 represents the mean of dependent variable among people with 
64<= age<65. P-values reported in column 2 of each sub-panel are for test that coefficients of additional covariates relative to the model 
in column 1 are jointly equal to zero. P-values reported in column 4 of each sub-panel are for test that coefficients of additional 
covariates relative to model in column 3 are jointly equal to zero.Table 4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Changes in Treatment Intensity
Length of Stay Procedure Count Log Charges
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Over 65 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.036
[0.24] [0.26] [0.26] [0.35] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.013]
Year/Month/Sat/Sun N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Race and Gender N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Condition FE N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
Mean Age 64-65 8.12 8.12 8.12 8.12 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 9.757 9.757 9.757 9.757
Observations 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 352,652 352,652 352,652 352,652
P-Value 0.000 0.266 0.000 0.558 0.000 0.537
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Standard errors in square brackets.Table 5: Changes in the use of Specific Procedures for the Two Most Common Causes of Admission in the Non-deferrable Sample

























Age Over 65 0.44 -1.89 3.79 3.41 4.04 0.67 2.15 1.52 0.72 2.59 1.82 0.11
[0.12] [0.82] [1.54] [1.56] [1.57] [1.43] [1.41] [1.19] [1.08] [1.09] [1.09] [1.02]
Mean 64-65 5.00 7.90 53.76 47.78 45.46 29.08 28.01 19.07 17.58 14.11 13.22 11.74
Observations 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170 39,170
R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.01

























Age Over 65 0.00 2.01 -2.22 -0.07 -1.20 0.91 0.18 -0.04 -0.20 0.46 -0.60 -0.12
[0.05] [1.26] [0.89] [0.85] [0.69] [0.66] [0.65] [0.61] [0.48] [0.43] [0.46] [0.35]
Mean 64-65 1.19 55.38 14.66 13.56 8.13 7.00 6.80 6.18 3.80 2.68 3.34 1.89
Observations 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514 60,514
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in square brackets. All models include a quadratic polynomial in age, fully interacted with a dummy for age over 65. Dummy for just under 65 is set to 1 for people 
admitted to the hospital in the 31 days before their 65th birthday. Race and gender represent dummies for race/ethnicity and gender. Table reports coefficient estimates from linear probability 
models for total number of procedures (column 1), event of no procedures (column 2) and indicators for specific procedures (columns 3-12) fit to subsamples of admissions with indicated 
principle admission diagnoses. Coefficient estimates for event of no procedures and for individual procedures (identified by procedure codes in column headings) are multiplied by 100, as are 
associated means for people with 64<=age<65. The procedures in the order they appear are: 88.56 Coronary arteriography using two catheters, 37.22 Left heart cardiac catheterization, 
88.53 Angiocardiography of left heart structures, 36.01 Percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty, 88.72 Diagnostic ultrasound of heart, 99.29 Injection or infusion of other therapeutic 
or prophylactic substance, 36.06 Insertion of non-drug-eluting coronary artery stent(s), 89.54 Electrographic monitoring, 39.61 Extracorporeal circulation auxiliary to open heart surgery, 37.23 
Combined right and left heart cardiac catheterization, 93.94 Respiratory medication administered by nebulizer, 89.65 Measurement of systemic arterial blood gases, 93.96 Other oxygen 
enrichment, 89.54 Electrographic monitoring, 88.72 Diagnostic ultrasound of heart, 96.04 Insertion of endotracheal tube, 96.71 Continuous mechanical ventilation for less than 96 consecutive 
hours, 96.72 Continuous mechanical ventilation for 96 consecutive hours or more, 89.52 Electrocardiogram, 38.93 Venous catheterization, not elsewhere classified.Table 6: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Changes in Transfer  and Readmission Probabilities
Across Hospitals Within Hospital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Over 65 (x100) 0.35 0.40 0.48 0.86 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.94
[0.24] [0.25] [0.24] [0.33] [0.20] [0.20] [0.20] [0.27]
Year/Month/Sat/Sun N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Race and Gender N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Condition FE N N Y Y N N Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N N N Y N N N Y
Mean Age 64-65 (x100) 6.87 6.87 6.87 6.87 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02
Observations 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386
P-Value 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.436
Readmission Within 7 Days of Discharge Readmission Within 28 Days of Discharge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Over 65 (x100) -0.36 -0.18 -0.16 -0.48 -0.92 -0.61 -0.63 -0.79
[0.24] [0.24] [0.24] [0.34] [0.36] [0.37] [0.37] [0.50]
Year/Month/Sat/Sun N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Race and Gender N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Condition FE N N Y Y N N Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N N N Y N N N Y
Mean Age 64-65 (x100) 6.59 6.59 6.59 6.59 17.02 17.02 17.02 17.02
Observations 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386
P-Value 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.800
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Standard errors in square brackets. Admissions with missing Social Security Numbers cannot be tracked and 
are dropped from the sample used in this tableTable 7: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Changes in Mortality Rates
Died Within 7 Days of Admission Died Within 14 Days of Admission Died Within 28 Days of Admission
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Over 65 (x100) -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -0.7 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -0.7 -1.1 -1.0 -0.9 -0.6
[0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.2] [0.2] [0.2] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.4]
Year/Month/Sat/Sun N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Race and Gender N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Condition FE N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
Mean Age 64-65 (x 100) 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.8
Observations 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386
P-Value  0.000  0.311  0.000  0.860  0.000  0.598
Died Within 90 Days of Admission Died Within 180 Days of Admission Died Within 365 Days of Admission
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Over 65 (x100) -1.1 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -1.2 -1.1 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -0.7 -0.4
[0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.3] [0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.4] [0.5]
Year/Month/Sat/Sun N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Race and Gender N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Dummy Just Under 65 N Y Y Y N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Condition FE N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N N N Y N N N Y N N N Y
Mean Age 64-65 (x 100) 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.4 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0
Observations 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386 407,386
P-Value  0.000 0.466 0.000  0.154 0.000 0.104
Notes: See notes to Table 3. Standard errors in square brackets. Admissions with missing Social Security Numbers cannot be linked to death records and are dropped from the sample used 





( > 6.62) (2.54-6.51) (0.96-2.54) ( < 0.96)
1. RD in Admissions % 7.12 11.85 2.43 3.23 3.57 2.70 0.56
2. RD in Mortality -0.46 -0.29 -0.49 0.27 -0.63 -0.45 -1.09
3. Just Under 65 death rate 5.10 3.29 6.86 2.68 7.41 6.87 10.25
4. Worst Case Bias -0.33 -0.36 -0.15 -0.10 -0.24 -0.17 -0.05
5. Lower Bound Estimate  -0.13 0.06 -0.33 0.37 -0.39 -0.27 -1.04
6. SE on Lower Bound  0.07 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.29
7. Share of Obs 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12
Notes: See text for discussion of lower bound formula. All terms are expressed as percentages. Entry in row 1 is estimated regression 
discontinuity (RD) in log admissions at age 65 (multiplied by 100). Entry in row 2 is estimated RD in 28-day mortality at age 65 (in 
percents). Entry in row 3 is estimated 28-day mortality rate for people just under 65 (in percents). Entry in row 4 is estimated worst-case 
bias in 28 day mortality caused by selective increase in admissions rates after age 65 (in percents). Entry in row 5 is lower bound 
estimate of effect of Medicare eligibility on 28-day mortality rate (in percents). Entry in row 6 is estimated standard error of lower-bound 
mortality effect (in percents) estimated by delta method. Entry in row 7 is share of total sample included in column sub-sample. Sub-
samples in columns 4-8 do not add up to overall sub-sample of ER and unplanned admissions in column 3 because admissions whose 





























Men and Women Men and Women Fitted
Men Men Fitted
Women Women FittedAppendix B: RDD in Admissions Estimated With a Cubic Polynomial
Non ER or Planned ER and Unplanned
Weekend t-stat > 
6.62
Age Over 65 0.12028 0.13144 0.02568 0.03825 0.0332 0.0564
[0.00493] [0.00693] [0.00498] [0.00692] [0.01069] [0.01465]
Dummy Age 64.91-65 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N Y N Y N Y
Observations 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652





Weekend t-stat < 
0.96
Age Over 65 0.0369 0.04436 0.03045 0.04183 0.00608 0.01932
[0.00974] [0.01357] [0.00982] [0.01378] [0.00924] [0.01270]
Dummy Age 64.91-65 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cubic Polynomial N Y N Y N Y
Observations 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652 3,652
R-Squared 0.54 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.52 0.52
Notes:  See notes from Table 2.Note: People become eligible for Medicare on the 1st day of the month in which they turn 65. The youngest age at which a person can be eligible is 365.24*65 - 30. Everyone is eligible after 
their 65th birthday 65*365.24.


































































65*365.24 - 31Notes: Mortality predicted from a quadratic in age, condition FE, gender, race, ethnicity, year, month and day of week of arrival to the hospital.





































































Predicted 7 Day Mortality
Predicated 28 Day Mortality